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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of several environmental disasters and subsequent
outcries for action on the part of the government, environmental-
ists and the general public,' Congress passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA).2 Unfortunately, the result was a hurriedly passed and
confusing piece of legislation. 3 CERCLA's liability scheme is severe
and devoid of any meaningful safe harbors. It imposes strict4 and
joint and several,5 liability on all potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) ,6 regardless of fault or causation. 7 Additionally, the limited
defenses available under CERCLA are inadequate to protect those
PRPs acquiring property subsequent to the release of hazardous
substances. 8
CERCLA's strict liability scheme has resulted in unintended
and undesirable consequences. 9 Fearful of being compelled to re-
mediate contaminated property, landowners simply abandon con-
taminated sites, or "brownfields," thus avoiding CERCLA liability.'0
1. See generally United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp.
546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining CERCLA enacted in response to severe environ-
mental and public health effects caused by disposal of hazardous wastes).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, §§ 101-308 (1980) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)).
3. For a discussion of CERCIA's legislative history, see infra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of CERCLA's strict liability scheme, see infra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion ofjoint and several liability, see infra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
6. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For text of CERCLA section 107, see
infra note 34.
7. For a discussion of causation and fault under CERCLA's liability scheme,
see infra notes 45-47.
8. For a discussion of the defenses available to PRPs under CERCLA, see infra
notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the brownfields phenomenon, see infra notes 79-97 and
accompanying text.
10. Brownfields are defined as "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial
and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by
real or perceived environmental contamination." U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, THE BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA (1995).
2
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As a result, these sites remain vacant, and the contamination is per-
mitted to go unchecked and unremediated."
In an attempt to alleviate the harsh effects of CERCLA's liabil-
ity scheme, Congress amended CERCLA in 1986, passing the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 12 The
primary significance of SARA's enactment is the codification of the
"innocent landowner" defense.13 Regrettably, few landowners are
able to satisfy its stringent requirements, thereby precluding invoca-
tion of the defense. 14
After sixteen years of experience with CERCLA's insurmounta-
ble liability scheme, a movement has surfaced to mitigate the stat-
ute's harsh effects.15 This movement comes as Congress debates
Superfund Reauthorization bills.' 6 Proponents of easing CER-
CLA's liability scheme suggest passage of legislation which would
grant liability protection to owners, prospective purchasers and de-
velopers once they remediate a site to a predetermined standard. 17
As the law currently stands, however, owners, as well as prospective
purchasers, of contaminated property subject themselves to CER-
CLA's strict liability component.18
Part II of this Comment begins with a general overview of CER-
CIA's strict liability component and courts' subsequent interpreta-
tion of this provision.' 9 Subsequently, Part III provides a brief
11. For a discussion of why prospective purchasers and developers are reluc-
tant to develop brownfields, see infra notes 92-94.
12. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (West
Supp. 1987)).
13. For a discussion of the "innocent landowner" defense, see infra notes 57-
62.
14. In order to qualify, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he did not have "knowledge" of the release or threatened release of
hazardous material on the property prior to acquiring the property. See CERCLA
§ 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). For a discussion of the elements necessary to establish
the defense, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the effects of CERCILA's liability scheme, see infra
notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2500, 1st Sess., 101st Cong. (1995) (sponsored by
Rep. Michael Oxley).
17. For a discussion of federal brownfield redevelopment proposals, see infra
notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
18. Landowners remain fully liable for remediation of contaminated property
regardless of fault or causation unless they can prove they fall within the provisions
of the innocent landowner defense. For a discussion of the innocent landowner
defense, see infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of CERCLA's strict liability component, see infra notes 40-
44 and accompanying text.
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overview of the brownfields phenomenon.2 0 Lastly, Part IV focuses
on the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards
Act of 1995 (Act 2)21 which the Pennsylvania State Legislature
passed and Governor Thomas Ridge signed into law to address and
remediate the brownfields problem in Pennsylvania.22
II. BACKGROUND
Congress passed CERCLA in response to growing concerns
over the release of hazardous materials into the environment.2 3
CERCLA's primary goal is to identify PRPs2 4 and to force them to
pay for the costs of remediation25 resulting from the release of haz-
ardous substances.2 6 To this end, CERCLA imposes strict liability.2 7
20. For a discussion of the brownfields phenomenon, see infra notes 79-97
and accompanying text.
21. Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act §§ 101-
907, 35 P.S. §§ 6026.101-907 (1995).
22. For a discussion of the purpose of Act 2, see infra notes 104-07 and accom-
panying text.
23. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 548
(W.D.N.Y. 1988).
24. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The stat-
ute defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
Id.
25. CERCLA § 101 (24) defines "remedial action" as:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment... The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of
residents and businesses and community facilities where the President de-
termines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such reloca-
tion is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition off-
site of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the
public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous sub-
stances and associated contaminated materials.
CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
26. One of the primary goals of CERCLA was to provide a means to expedi-
tiously and effectively cleanup perilous contamination of hazardous waste. Ste-
phen M. Feldman, C3RCLA Liability, Where it is and Where it Should Not be Going: The
Possibility of Liability Release for Environmentally Beneficial Land Transfers, 23 E'~vrTL. L.
295, 298 (1993). See generally Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of
Parent Corporations For Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. RIv.
421 (1989-90) (explaining Congress enacted CERCLA to address emerging prob-
lem associated with cost of cleaning up nation's hazardous waste disposal sites).
Additionally, Congress's second goal was to create a mechanism to ensure that
those persons deemed responsible for any contamination did not escape the finan-
4




Because Congress enacted CERCIA in the closing days of the
96th Congress, its passage represented an eleventh hour compro-
mise.2 8 As a result, CERCLA is infamously known for its poor
cial obligation of rectifying the problem. Feldman, supra note 26, at 298. To
achieve these goals, Congress created two mechanisms whereby the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could initiate cleanup of hazardous waste
sites. Id. Section 103 of CERCIA authorizes EPA to unilaterally order a potentially
responsible party to undertake personal abatement actions, thus requiring them to
pay for and conduct cleanup operations while EPA oversees the operation to en-
sure compliance. Id. at 297. Section 106 reads in pertinent part: "The President
may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under this section
including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and welfare and the environment." CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a).
The second response mechanism is contained in title 26 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, creating the Superfund program. See 26 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Con-
gressional appropriations created a monetary trust fund to enable EPA to engage
in cleanup activities of the nation's most hazardous waste sites and then seek in-
demnification from PRPs. Feldman, supra note 26, at 297. The underlying goal of
CERCLA, however, is to "protect and promote the public interest." Id. at 298.
27. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992). CERCLA, how-
ever, does not specify the standard of liability to be imposed on a PRP. Rather, the
statute incorporates the liability provision of section 311 of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act (Clean Water Act), which states "[t]he terms 'liable' or 'liability'
under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which ob-
tains under section 1321 of this tile." CERCLA § 101 (32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32).
Section 1321 of the Clean Water Act states in pertinent part as follows:
Any owner, operator, or person in charge of any vessel, onshore facil-
ity, or offshore facility-
(i) from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in viola-
tion of paragraph (3), or
(ii) who fails or refuses to comply with any regulation issued under
subsection (j) of this section to which that owner, operator, or person in
charge is subject,
may be assessed a class I or class II civil penalty by the Secretary of
the department in which the Coast Guard is operating or the
Administrator.
CWA § 1321, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (A). See also United States v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that while express language of
statute provides little guidance to indicate Congress's intent, statute operates
under strict liability theory); True v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D.
Wyo. 1985) (stating statute imposes strict liability regardless of fault), affd in part,
894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). "Because strict liability involves the shifting of
fault to the one most able to bear the cost and insure against the risk, it has been
held that FWPCA is a means of transferring the risk from the public to the opera-
tor of the facility causing a harmful discharge." Id. at 1374. For a discussion of
CERCLA's strict liability component, see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
28. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985). See
also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J. ENvrL. L. 1 (1982).
Grad notes that although Congress worked on Superfund toxic and hazardous
waste cleanup bills for over three years, the bill that finally became law had little
1997]
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draftsmanship and ambiguous statutory construction.29 When ana-
lyzing CERCLA's liability provision, therefore, courts consistently
cite the legislative history and purpose when reading strict liability
into the language of the statute.30
B. Statutory Construction
Courts have taken primarily two approaches when discerning
the proper statutory construction of CERCLA. Following the first
approach, a majority of courts begin their analysis by quoting the
remedial purpose of the statute.31 Under this rubric, courts liber-
ally construe the statute's provisions in order to "avoid frustration
of the [statute's] beneficial legislative purpose."32 Under the sec-
legislative history. Id. at 1. While the bill was deficient in many respects, Grad
notes that the legislation that did become law was the best that could be done. Id.
at 2. The passage of CERCLA created a law conferring sufficient authorization to
begin cleanup of old hazardous waste sites, prevent future spills and protect health
and the environment. Id.
29. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonnolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209
(3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit noted that "congressional intent may be particu-
larly difficult to discern with precision in CERCLA, a statute notorious for its lack
of clarity and poor draftsmanship." Id. at 1221 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. Gov-
ernment of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 651 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Ded-
ham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir.
1986) (commenting CERCLA has acquired well-deserved notoriety for vaguely
drafted provisions and indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history) (quoting
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985))). See generally Grad,
supra note 28, at 2 (noting time constraints imposed on passage of bill resulted in
only fragmented legislative history, adding to already difficult task of discerning
full meaning of law).
30. Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991).
For a discussion of courts' interpretation of CERCLA's strict liability component,
see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
31. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating CERCLA is remedial statute "designed to protect and preserve public
health and the environment"); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev.
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding CERCLA's purpose to provide
federal government with means to control spread of hazardous material); Anspec,
922 F.2d at 1241 (noting CERCLA intended to provide for cleanup of hazardous
waste sites and spills); Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 823 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir.
1987) (concluding CERCLA intended primarily to facilitate prompt cleanup by
placing ultimate financial burden on those parties responsible for hazardous
waste).
CERCLA authorizes the federal government to respond in several ways: (1) by
allowing EPA to use Superfund resources to cleanup hazardous waste sites and
spills pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9611; (2) by enabling EPA to sue for reimbursement
of cleanup costs from any responsible party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607; or (3) by
authorizing EPA to seek an injunction in federal district court to force a responsi-
ble party to cleanup any site or spill that represents an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a). Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041.
32. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 26. See also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040
(stating CERCIA designed to bring order to array of partly redundant, partly inad-
6
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ond approach, courts are more cautious, invoking their authority to
construe CERCLA only when a particular provision is ambiguous.33
C. CERCLA Liability
Section 107 of CERCLA sets forth the criteria under which
PRPs are liable for the production of hazardous waste contamina-
tion.3 4 Imposition of liability under CERCLA requires a finding
that: (1) the contaminated property or site is a "vessel" or "facil-
ity";3 5 (2) a "release"3 6 or threatened release of a "hazardous sub-
equate federal hazardous substances cleanup and compensation laws) (quoting F.
ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND Poucv 569 (1984)).
33. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1241-45. The Sixth Circuit noted that the authority to
construe a statute lies at the very heart ofjudicial power and, thus, is not subject to
scrutiny. Id. at 1245. The court discerned, however, that "the authority to con-
strue is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to
provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt." Id. (quoting
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Worker Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97
(1981)). If a statute is clear and well-defined, a judicial decision that expands or
contracts its reach or adds or deletes remedies creates federal common law. Id.
34. See CERCIA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Parties falling within CERCLA's lia-
bility provisions include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance....
Id.
35. The term "vessel" is defined as "every description of watercraft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on water." Id. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(28). CERCLA defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (in-
cluding any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, mo-
tor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a haz-
ardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer prod-
uct in consumer use or any vessel.
Id. § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
36. CERCLA defines "release" very broadly as:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environ-
ment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers,
and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pol-
1997]
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stance"37 from the facility has occurred; (3) "response costs"38 have
been incurred as a result of the release or threatened release; and
(4) the party to be held liable falls within one of the four classes of
PRPs described in section 107 of CERCLA.3 9
D. Strict Liability
While section 107 delineates which persons will be liable for
the costs of cleaning up a contaminated piece of property, the stat-
ute fails to articulate the standard of liability to be imposed on
PRPs.40 The legislative history, however, indicates the drafters in-
lutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in ex-
posure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which
such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emis-
sions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft,
vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source, by-
product, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those
terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011
et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements with respect to financial
protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under sec-
tion 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 2210], or, for the purposes of section
9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source by-
product, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated
under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
37. CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b) (2) (A) of Title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste hav-
ing the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including
any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any
toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazard-
ous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance
or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pur-
suant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifi-
cally listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs
(A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural
gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for
fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
38. Although CERCLA does not expressly define the term "response costs," it
does define the terms "response" or "respond" to mean: "remove, removal, rem-
edy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'reme-
dial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." Id. § 101(25), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(25).
39. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989). For the
text of section 9607(a), setting forth the four classes of PRPs, see supra note 34.
40. Id.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss1/4
BROWNFIELDS LEGISLATION
tended to hold PRPs strictly liable.41 Under CERCLA, liability is
not dependent on fault, causation or contribution to contamina-
tion.4 2 Instead, CERCLA endeavors to spread the risks and costs
41. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Senator Randolph
prior to passage of CERCLA). "Unless otherwise provided in this act, the standard
of liability is intended to be the same as that provided in section 311 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. I understand this to be a standard of strict liability."
Id. Additionally, Senator Randolph remarked, "it is intended that the issue of lia-
bility not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by traditional and evolving
principles of common law." Id.
CERCLA relies on the common law of ultrahazardous activities to justify the
imposition of strict liability. Grad, supra note 28, at 9. The Restatement Second of
Torts defines the general principle of "ultrahazardous activity" in pertinent part as
follows: "[olne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liabil-
ity for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm .... " RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977).
Although a provision on joint and several liability was taken out before final
passage, the drafters intended joint and several liability to be imposed on those
found liable under section 9607. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of
Senator Randolph). Senator Randolph remarked that the removal of the refer-
ence to joint and several liability was made "in recognition of the difficulty in pre-
scribing in statutory terms liability standards which will be applicable in individual
cases. The changes do not reflect a rejection of the standards [of joint and several
liability]." Id. Rather, the drafters intended that the issue of liability under CER-
CILA be resolved by the courts and traditional principles of common law. Id. See
also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting court
should consider traditional and evolving principles of federal common law when
deciding whether to impose joint and several liability); United States v. Stringfel-
low, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("[I]mposingjoint and several liabil-
ity carries out the legislative intent by insuring that responsible parties will fulfill
their obligations to [cleanup] the hazardous waste facility."); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (stating legislative history
and statutory language support imposition of joint and several liability).
42. Robert S. Berger, Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Chal-
lenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BuFF. ErvTL. L.J. 69 (1995); see, e.g., New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting interpreting sec-
tion 9607(a)(1) as including causation requirement would make affirmative de-
fense provided in section 9607(b) superfluous). The Second Circuit noted that
each of the defenses listed in section 9607(b) carves out from liability an exception
based on causation. Id. The court refused to construe CERCLA in a manner
which would make some of its provisions surplusage without a clear congressional
mandate. Id. Additionally, the Second Circuit noted Congress explicitly rejected
incorporating a causation requirement into section 9607(a). Id. See also Stringfel-
low, 661 F. Supp. at 1060 (stating causation established if defendant falls into one
of categories listed in section 107(a)). The Stringellow court noted that. the legisla-
tive history indicates Congress did not intend for traditional causation require-
ments to apply for purposes of determining liability under section 107(a). Id.
A secondary goal of imposing strict liability under CERCLA is to simplify the
government's ability to compel cleanups at the least possible cost to the govern-
ment. Berger, supra note 42, at 82; see also Feldman, supra note 26, at 308 (noting
deterrence of environmentally damaging activities believed to be primary impetus
behind CERCLA's enactment). Feldman notes that "the most influential aspect of
the statute's liability scheme has been its prescriptive effect on minimizing hazard-
ous waste contamination." Id.
1997]
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between all parties associated with the hazardous waste industry.43
Accordingly, courts have affirmed the imposition of strict liability,
imposing liability on PRPs in almost every conceivable situation."
E. Consequences of No-Fault Liability Under CERCLA
The no-fault liability scheme imposed under CERCLA has
been the subject of much debate and the focal point of criticism. 4 5
As one commentator has noted, "[the] initial decade of CERCLA
has been highlighted by liability with virtually no exemptions."46
While the strict liability provision is equitable for those PRPs en-
gaged in abnormally dangerous activities, it is clearly inequitable
with respect to the majority of PRPs who innocently purchase con-
taminated property and yet are still subject to CERCLA's strict lia-
bility component.47
43. Id.
44. See United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 484 (8th Cir.
1992) (stating CERCIA is remedial strict liability statute with focus on responsibil-
ity rather than culpability); Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041 (stating Congress
intended responsible parties be held strictly liable even though explicit provision
for strict liability was not included in compromise); String[ellow, 661 F. Supp. at
1062 (finding plain meaning of statute is unambiguous and reveals Congress's in-
tent to impose strict liability on defendants subject only to the affirmative defenses
listed in section 107(b)). See generally Feldman, supra note 26, at 306 (noting that
facially CERCLA is response measure providing after-the-fact mechanism to ensure
hazardous waste sites are cleaned at least to statutorily prescribed minimum
levels).
Feldman comments that in an attempt to eradicate environmental disasters,
the drafters of CERCLA's liability-driven provisions made a conscious choice to
hold no-fault PRPs liable to the fullest extent of the law. Id. at 307. The decision
to include even no-fault PRPs within the strict liability umbrella arose out of fear
that any "fault-based" balancing system would deplete the limited federal resources
before the public interest was served. Id. at 307. See also Anspec Co. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding construing CERCLA to
include successor liability is consistent with legislative purpose of act); United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985) (concluding con-
gressional intent supports finding PRPs retroactively liable for response costs and
contamination occurring prior to CERCLA enactment); United States v. Fleet Fac-
tors Co., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating secured creditor may be
liable under section 107(a) even though not actual operator by participating in
financial management of facility to degree indicating capacity to influence facility's
treatment of hazardous waste).
45. Berger, supra note 42, at 78-79.
46. Feldman, supra note 26, at 300.
47. Berger, supra note 42, at 80. It is equitable to impose strict liability on
PRPs engaged in abnormally dangerous activities because they are usually finan-
cially secure and furthermore, have profited from the production and handling of
waste. Id. Thus, they should absorb the costs associated with their activities. Id.
Additionally, because these PRPs have been forewarned as to the consequences of
their actions, they can factor the costs of cleanup into their operating costs. Id.
Conversely, developers and owners who have not played any role in contaminating
a site should not be held responsible for the contamination caused by a prior
10
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Because of CERCLA's harsh liability scheme, would-be devel-
opers and owners are discouraged from purchasing even minimally
contaminated property for fear of being brought within section
107's liability provisions. As a result, contaminated property lies
dormant.48 Rather than using minimally contaminated old indus-
trial and commercial sites for new purposes, developers locate
new factories, offices and warehouses in the suburbs, creating in-
tense development pressure and changing the nature of many
communities. 49
F. SARA: Amendments to Superfund
In 1986 Congress amended CERCLA, enacting the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).50 Congress
enacted SARA in response to: (1) the effect of CERCLA's harsh lia-
bility provisions on innocent landowners;51 and (2) an increased
awareness of the problems which abandoned hazardous waste sites
owner. Id. "While the liability scheme achieves its ends [in the form of] economic
efficiency, fairness, deterrence and risk spreading, the collateral effect is to dis-
courage redevelopment of commercial and industrial sites." Id.
48. See Berger, supra note 42, at 94. While environmental laws seek to clean
up serious problems of hazardous waste contamination by imposing the cost of
cleanup on those responsible for the contamination, they cause the unintended
result of discouraging recycling and redevelopment of urban industrial properties.
Id. Although these laws are not the sole cause for abandoning these sites, they
clearly represent a major obstacle to redevelopment and, therefore, serve to per-
petuate the problem. Id. The potential liability associated with industrial land cre-
ates a substantial risk of incurring enormous cleanup costs in order to return land
to productive use. Id. Consequently, even if land is inexpensive, cleanup opera-
tions can be prohibitively expensive and unpredictable. Id. For example, the costs
of an environmental audit for determining the amount of remediation necessary
are significant. Id. While greenfield sites are more expensive up front, the pro-
jected costs of developing the property are fixed and predictable, unlike
brownfields which cannot compare to the prudent financial investment of green-
fields. Id. Thus, cleanup costs represent yet another obstacle to recycling brown-
field sites. Id.
49. Id. at 96. The direct effect of abandoning old industrial and commercial
sites in favor of new sites is to perpetuate the industrialization of new land, compel-
ling new costs to build the infrastructure needed to accommodate these new devel-
opments. Id.
50. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1994)). See Feldman, supra note 26, at 295 (noting CERCLA amendments repre-
sented effort to expedite cleanup of hazardous waste sites and promote public in-
terest). "Congress amended CERCLA to provide a concrete settlement policy to
assist those potentially responsible parties who had little or no culpability, but still
faced strict liability for massive clean-up costs." Id.
51. For a discussion of CERCIA's harsh liability provisions affecting innocent
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pose to the environment. 52 Prior to SARA's enactment, CERCLA
granted PRPs a limited number of statutory defenses.53 A PRP
could escape liability only by proving the release, or threatened re-
lease resulted from: (1) an act of God;54 (2) an act of war;55 or (3)
an act or omission of a third party. 56 With the passage of SARA,
however, Congress created the "innocent landowner" defense.
5 7
Specifically, SARA amends CERCLA's definition of "contractual re-
lationship" to exclude PRPs acquiring property subsequent to the
release of hazardous materials and who would otherwise be liable
52. For a discussion of the problems abandoned hazardous waste sites pose to
the environment, see infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Mary E. Hitt, Desperately Seeking SARA, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 13
(1989) (noting prior to enactment of SARA, only four statutory defenses existed to
strict, joint and several, liability imposed on innocent landowners).
Section 9607(b) provides a limited number of statutory defenses to PRPs.
Subsection (b) reads as follows:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in con-
nection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement
arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances,
and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
54. Id. § 107(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1). For purposes of CERCLA, the
term "act of God" means "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of
which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight." Id. § 101(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1).
55. Id. § 107(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).
56. Id. § 107(b) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (5). For the textual language of CER-
CIA section 107, see supra note 53.
57. Although SARA does not specifically call this defense the "innocent land-
owner" defense, it is codified in CERCIA through the combination of several sec-
tions. See L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage ?,
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 157-58 (1992-93) (discussing SARA amendments' re-
quirements for invoking innocent landowner defense). Smith notes that the SARA
amendments creating the innocent landowner defense "were intended to 'clarify
and confirm' the terms of the third party defense." Id. at 157 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 962, 99-186 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3279).
12
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for the contamination. 58 Nevertheless, the defense is .only available
if the statutorily prescribed requirements of section 107 (i.e., the
third party defense) are satisfied. 59
58. Under the SARA amendments, "contractual relationship" is defined to in-
clude the following:
land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or posses-
sion, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located
was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the haz-
ardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circum-
stances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant
did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of
on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facil-
ity by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or
through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or
condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
CERCLA § 101 (35) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (A).
The alteration to the definition of "contractual relationship" excludes an in-
strument which transfers title if the PRP acquired the land after disposal of hazard-
ous materials and certain statutory requirements are satisfied. Smith, supra note
57, at 158-59.
59. CERCLA § 101 (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (i). Section 9601 (35) con-
tinues as follows:
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish
that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b) (3) (A) and (B)
of this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as pro-
vided in clause (I) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant
must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.
For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account
any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant,
the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if un-
contaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamina-
tion by appropriate inspection.
Id. § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
Additionally, because the "innocent landowner" defense is an affirmative de-
fense, the defendant must prove these requirements by a preponderance of the
evidence. Washington v. Time Oil, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
The defense does not provide shelter for a PRP who becomes aware of the
release of hazardous materials, or in some way contributed to the release of haz-
ardous substances. Sections 9601(35) (C) and (D) read as follows:
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b) (3) of this title shall
diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility
who would otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this
paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the de-
fendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred own-
ership of the property to another person without disclosing such
13
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1. Effect of "Innocent Landowner" Defense
The "innocent landowner" defense provides relief for those
PRPs acquiring land "without knowledge" of the release of hazard-
ous substances. 6° As a practical matter, however, information re-
garding contamination at a particular site is almost always
reasonably discernible at the time of sale, thus precluding invoca-
tion of the defense. 61 The innocent landowner defense, therefore,
does not actually address the real problem faced by individuals who
seek to sell or redevelop brownfields. 62
2. De Minimis Settlements
In addition to clarifying CERCLA's third party defense and cre-
ating the "innocent landowner" defense, SARA added a provision
permitting the United States Environmental Protection Agency
knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section
9607(a) (1) of this tide and no defense under section 9607(b) (3) of this
title shall be available to such defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter
of a defendant who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the sub-
ject of the action relating to the facility.
Id. § 101 (35) (C),(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (C),(D).
60. For a description of the requirements necessary for proving a PRP had
knowledge of the release of hazardous substances, thus removing the availability of
the defense, see supra note 59. The innocent landowner defense is essentially an
"ignorance" defense which serves to protect parties who in no way contributed to
the contamination, while distinguishing parties who found out contamination ex-
isted on the property from those who did not acquire knowledge of the contamina-
tion. Berger, supra note 42, at 84. See also United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur
Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989) (concluding level of inquiry must
only be appropriate and reasonable while rejecting government's contention that
no inquiry could ever meet statutory standard). But see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (finding innocent landowner
defense unavailable to contaminated site's present owner and related corporations
which knew present owner at site used hazardous substance); Washington v. Time
Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (stating defendant failing to
present specific facts to indicate some other party having employment, subsidiary
or contractual connection with defendant solely responsible for release of hazard-
ous substances found on defendant's property).
61. Berger, supra note 42, at 85. Most states require owners to list the exist-
ence of any contamination on the deed. Id. As a result, a prospective purchaser
will have specific knowledge of the existence of contamination prior to the sale of
the property, making the purchase of urban industrial property, without knowl-
edge of the presence of contamination, impossible. Id. Additionally, before lend-
ers will agree to purchase a piece of property they require the completion of an
environmental audit, further diminishing the likelihood a prospective purchaser
will lack knowledge of the existence of any contamination on the property. Id.
62. Id. EPA rarely permits application of the innocent landowner defense.
Id. Further, courts strictly construe the defense, further limiting its application.
Id.
14
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(EPA) to engage in legally binding settlements with PRPs.63 SARA
63. CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 22(g). The section states as follows:
(1) Expediated Final Settlement
[w]henever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the
President, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settle-
ment with a potentially responsible party in an administrative or civil ac-
tion under section 9606 or 9607 of this title if such settlement involves
only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned and,
in the judgment of the President, the conditions in either of the follow-
ing subparagraph (A) or (B) are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other haz-
ardous substances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by
that party to the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances con-
tributed by that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party-
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility
is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation,
storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility;
and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance at the facility through any action or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the potentially responsible party
purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that
the property was used for the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance.
(2) Covenant not to sue
The President may provide a covenant not to sue with respect to the facil-
ity concerned to any party who has entered into a settlement under this
subsection unless such a covenant would be inconsistent with the public
interest as determined under subsection (f) of this section.
(3) Expedited agreement
The President shall reach any such settlement or grant any such covenant
not to sue as soon as possible after the President has available the infor-
mation necessary to reach such a settlement or grant such a covenant.
(4) Consent decree or administrative order
A settlement under this subsection shall be entered as a consent decree
or embodied in an administrative order setting forth the terms of the
settlement. In the case of any facility where the total response costs ex-
ceed $500,000 (excluding interest), if the settlement is embodied as an
administrative order, the order may be issued only with the prior written
approval of the Attorney General. If the Attorney General or his desig-
nee has not approved or disapproved the order within 30 days of this
referral, the order shall be deemed to be approved unless the Attorney
General and the Administrator have agreed to extend the time. The dis-
trict court for the district in which the release or threatened release oc-
curs may enforce any such administrative order.
(5) Effect of agreement
A party who has resolved its liability to the United States under this sub-
section shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters
addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of
the other potentially responsible parties unless its terms so provide, but it
reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the
settlement.
(6) Settlements with other potentially responsible parties
1997]
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authorizes EPA to reach a final settlement with PRPs if "[the] settle-
ment involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the
facility concerned."6 Accordingly, although the de minimis settle-
ment provision of CERCLA appears to provide an opportunity for
innocent landowners to avoid exposure to CERCLA's liability
scheme, in reality, EPA has been very reluctant to relieve PRPs from
liability.65
In order to qualify under SARA's release provisions, the land-
owner must fall into one of two categories. Class "A" settling parties
are defined as those individuals "for whom the amounts or toxic
effects of their contributions to the hazard are minimal in compari-
son to other hazardous substances at the facility."66 Class "B" set-
tling parties are the actual owners of property who "did not conduct
or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment or dis-
posal of any hazardous substance at the facility," and "did not con-
tribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
at the facility."67 Furthermore, like the innocent landowner de-
fense, a class "B" settling party must have "purchased the property
without actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous sub-
stance" in order to qualify for a de minimis settlement.68
G. EPA Guidance: De Minimis Landowner Settlements and
Prospective Purchaser Settlements
In order to clarify the de minimis settlement provisions of
SARA, EPA issued an interpretive "guidance" in 1989.69 The gui-
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the authority of
the President to reach settlements with other potentially responsible par-
ties under this chapter.
Id. § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g).
64. For the textual language of CERCLA section 122(g), see supra note 63.
65. See Smith, supra note 57, at 176. The de minimis settlement provision, how-
ever, is susceptible to overreaching by EPA against innocent landowners. Id. Be-
cause EPA has superior resources to litigate against the defense, they are in the
position to require a party to essentially prove they meet the innocent landowner
defense before they will be willing to enter into a non-cash settlement. Id. As a
result, even a landowner believing he qualifies for the defense may chose to enter
into a settlement agreement rather than face the uncertainty of litigating the de-
fense in court. Id.
66. Smith, supra note 57, at 175. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). For
the statutorily prescribed requirements for a class "A" settling parties, see supra
note 63.
67. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 22(g) (1) (B) (iii).
68. Smith, supra note 57, at 175. The class "B" settling parties are those who
most likely would attempt to assert the innocent landowner defense. Id. at 176.
69. Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective
Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34235 (1989).
16
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dance states that the goal of settlements is to entitle parties satisfy-
ing the de minimis settlement criteria to resolve potential liability
issues as quickly as possible.70 By settling with PRPs, EPA hopes to
focus its resources on litigation with those parties primarily respon-
sible for the contamination. 71 Due to the restrictive circumstances
under which settlements are authorized, however, EPA has entered
into very few settlement agreements. 72
In 1995 EPA issued a second guidance, intending to expand
the circumstances under which they would be willing to enter into
settlement agreements. 73 Under the new guidance, EPA will enter
into agreements resulting in reduced benefits to EPA if doing so
would provide a substantial benefit to the community.74 Thus, the
second guidance encourages a more balanced evaluation of both
direct and indirect benefits of prospective purchaser agreements. 75
Despite SARA's amendments and EPA's interpretive guid-
ances, the brownfields problem persists. 76 CERCLA's strict liability
scheme continues to be the primary impediment to land re-
cycling. 77 Unless prospective purchasers and developers are
granted significant reprieves from liability, the legislatures' continu-
ous, and yet ineffective, tinkering with CERCLA's provisions




72. For a discussion of EPA's desire to enter into settlement agreements
under more circumstances, see infra notes 73-74.
73. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON SETTLEMENTS
wiTH PROSPECTrIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1995). "Experience
has demonstrated that prospective purchaser agreements might be both appropri-
ate and beneficial in more circumstances than contemplated by the 1989 gui-
dance." Id.
74. Id. Under the guidance, EPA will enter into settlement agreements with
prospective purchasers of contaminated properties if the direct benefits to the
community include such things as: (1) creation or retention ofjobs, (2) productive
use of abandoned property, or (3) revitalization of blighted areas. Id.
75. Id. Indirect benefits include: (1) measures that serve to reduce substan-
tially the risk posed by the site; (2) creation of conservation or recreation areas;
and (3) provisions for community services such as improved public transportation
and infrastructure. Id.
76. For a discussion of the brownfields problem, see infra notes 79-97 and
accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of CERCLA's strict liability scheme, see supra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.




Kessler: The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act: P
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
178 VILANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 161
III. THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON
Due to CERCLA's liability scheme, private parties lack both
legal and economic incentives to voluntarily investigate and remedi-
ate contamination at industrial sites.79 Uncertainty concerning en-
vironmental liability has forced developers to look to greenfields, as
opposed to brownfields, for new development projects, thus caus-
ing the proliferation of brownfields nationwide.80 As the nation
shifts from an industrial base to a more diversified economy, how-
ever, the same question remains: can the millions of acres of al-
ready contaminated property be made safe and productive for
future economic development?8 1
A. Economic Disincentives to Brownfields Redevelopment
In addition to fears regarding liability, economic considera-
tions also drive would-be developers toward greenfields.8 2 The re-
79. R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntay Cleanup Legisla-
tion, 2 ENvrL. LAWYER 101, 105-06 (1995). Courts have not hesitated to hold PRPs
strictly liable even though the PRPs may have voluntarily disclosed the presence of
contamination. Id. at 106. As Representative Michael Oxley notes, "we supposedly
live in a recycling society. We are urged to recycle cans, homes, cardboard, and
newspapers. But, curiously, we are failing to recycle one of our most valuable re-
sources-established industrial sites." Will Brownfields Initiatives Really Work), THE
ENVrL. F. May-June 1995, 28, at 32 [hereinafter Brownfields Initiative] (quoting Rep-
resentative Michael Oxley). Regulations that were supposed to protect people and
their communities have driven jobs away and have exposed residents to contamina-
tion for longer periods of time. Id. Potential developers all too often initiate de-
velopment on greenfields, foregoing the multitude of regulations and potential
liability associated with the redevelopment of old industrial sites, thus unnecessa-
rily destroying prime farmland. Urban Land Reclamation: Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the House Committee on Science, Space
and Technology, 103d Cong. 135 (1994) [hereinafter Urban Reclamation Hearings]
(statement of Representative Tim Valentine). For a discussion of legal barriers to
selling, developing or reusing industrial sites due to CERCLA liability structure,
see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
80. Sweeney, supra note 79, at 110. See also Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra
note 79. It is estimated that there are as many as 500,000 sites nationwide that
show some evidence of contamination which could trigger Superfund rules, thus
inhibiting the ability of owners to sell or reuse the property. Id. (statement of
Representative McHale). "Over the last 20 years, United States industry and com-
merce has increasingly tended to move away from the cities to the suburbs." E.
Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Broznfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of
Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,337 (July
1995). Owners seeking to sell, redevelop or expand existing operations face the
stigma of site contamination. Id. See also Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79
(statement of Representative Tim Valentine, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tech-
nology, Environment and Aviation).
81. See Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79 (statement of Representative
Valentine, Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation).
82. Id. (statement of Dr. A. E. Mofitt, Jr., Vice President, Health and Environ-
ment at Bethlehem Steel Corp.). Developers must also overcome the lending com-
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development of abandoned urban hazardous material sites,
however, benefits developers, local communities and the environ-
ment. If remediated, reused or redeveloped for industrial, com-
mercial or residential purposes, many idle properties possess
valuable economic potential.83 While the majority of industrial
sites are located in "prime" downtown areas with preexistent infra-
structures, the cleanup of these sites entails potentially higher risks
and costs than those associated with the development of virgin
land. 84 By taking advantage of existing infrastructures, however, re-
habilitated brownfields are capable of housing emerging technolo-
gies and manufacturing processes, thus, reducing urban sprawl.8 5
munities unwillingness to finance mortgages on brownfield sites. Grayson, supra
note 80. Lenders are concerned about inheriting liability in the event of default or
foreclosure. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79 (statement of Representa-
tive McHale). Additionally, lenders fear the loss of collateral value and the effect
of cleanup costs on a project's viability. Id. Lenders, lessors and other financial
sources cite several worries regarding financing the cleanup of contaminated
properties including: (1) borrower's cleanup costs may compromise their ability
to repay their debts; (2) contaminated properties are poor collateral and can leave
a lender with no assets if the deal ultimately fails; and (3) the prospects of direct
liability for remediation costs which may exceed the amount of money placed at
risk in the first place. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 79, at 34 (statement of Hank
Schilling, Vice President, Environmental Support, G.E. Capital).
The biggest impediment to recycling brownfields, however, is that potential
response costs are often greater than the properties' value. Id. (statement ofJohn
Rosenthal). This has spawned the emergence of a concept called "landbanking,"
whereby current property owners, fearing discovery of contamination by state or
federal agencies, do not offer property for sale. Id.
83. Sweeney, supra note 79, at 107. See Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note
79. The existence of these idle properties poses tremendous problems for our
nation's communities. Id. Some of the problems associated with brownfields in-
clude the folowing: (1) deterioration of environmental contamination; (2) sup-
pression of economic development; and (3) reduction of jobs which would have
been created from productive reuse of the site. Id.
84. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79, at 2 (statement of Representa-
tive Valentine). Site preparation costs of brownfield redevelopment projects are
significantly lower than the costs associated with developing virgin land and re-
sources. Sweeney, supra note 79, at 108. Developing'greenfields requires expendi-
tures for installing roadways, water lines, sewers and electricity. Id. In this era of
budget constraints, the government can no longer afford to pay for public utilities
and highways to accommodate site development out in the "sticks." Judith Evans,
Cleaning Up the Nation's Brownfields; Critics Want Some Assurances Industrial Sites Aren't
Re-Polluted, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1995, at El.
85. Sweeney, supra note 79, at 107. Facilities left vacant deteriorate, thus invit-
ing vandalism, arson and midnight dumping. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra
note 79 (statement of Representative McHale). Additionally, the longer the
properties are left vacant, the greater the chance of spreading contamination. Id.
This further diminishes property value and increases cleanup costs in addition to
threatening the economic viability of adjacent properties. Id. The properties can
be bought inexpensively and, subsequent redevelopment brings jobs to local com-
munities and growth to the inner cities while concurrently leaving greenfields pris-
tine. Grayson, supra note 80.
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B. Identifying Barriers to Recycling Contaminated Properties
Supporters of brownfield redevelopment initiatives complain
that the current law is confusing and overly stringent.8 6 By impos-
ing strict and unattainable standards, federal and state environmen-
tal laws further contribute to the abandonment of brownfields. 87
Consequently, in many instances, property owners are required to
cleanup contaminated industrial sites to a heightened level which is
incompatible with the projected use of the property.18
C. Proposed Amendments to Superfund: Encouraging
Brownfields Redevelopment
The linchpin of proposed amendments to CERCLA is the ex-
emption from liability for prospective purchasers of contaminated
properties.89 Legislative proposals should limit the liability of own-
ers and re-developers by establishing cleanup standards based upon
risks to health and the environment created by properties in their
foreseeable future use.90 A carefully monitored, restricted-use and
risk-based cleanup plan, which is based upon the actual and foresee-
86. Bernard A. Weintraub & Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, NR&E,
Spring 1995, at 57.
87. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 79, at 30 (statement of Joanne R.
Denworth, President, Pennsylvania Environmental Council). "The basic
brownfields-greenfields concept is a good one: expedite the cleanup of contami-
nated, brownfield sites, and slow the loss of open, greenfields to development, by
encouraging cleanup and reuse of old sites .... ." Id. See, e.g., Reform of
Superfund Act of 1995, H.R. 2500, 104th Cong. §§ 101-05 (1995). The bill seeks to
amend CERCLA to: (1) require EPA to offer final covenants not to sue to settling
parties who meet certain requirements and pay a premium; (2) add provisions
providing for delegation of authority to states to take action at National Priority
List sites within the state; and (3) establish a more active role for the states. See id.
88. Evans, supra note 84, at El. The issue of what the remediation standards
will entail must be determined so that widely accepted cleanup standards and regu-
lations can be created to recognize variations between residential, commercial and
industrial uses. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79, at 23 (statement of
Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst for Economic Development, Northeast Mid-
west Institute). Cleanup standards should take into account the ultimate use of
the property because cleaning an abandoned manufacturing facility to a safe level
is significantly less expensive than cleaning it for residential or even commercial
purposes. Id. "Part of the push for brownfields legislation at the state and federal
level[ ] stems from effort[s] to curtail [EPA's] oversight of the cleanup of proper-
ties whose contamination levels are less threatening than those for other large sites
on the [National] Superfund [L]ist (NSL)." Evans, supra note 84, at El.
89. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79, at 86 (statement of Timothy
Fields, Jr., Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, EPA). As Charles Bartsch noted: "[t] he issue of liability needs to
be clarified so that a new generation of legitimate 'innocent landowner' defenses
can take hold. .. ." Id. at 29.
90. Brownfields Initiativ supra note 79, at 30 (statement of Joanne R.
Denworth).
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able reuse of property, is a workable solution to the current brown-
field situation.91
Any legislative proposal, however, will be ineffective if it fails to
address the need for certainty, an element conclusively lacking
from Superfund.92 The key to successful redevelopment of
brownfields is the establishment of a clear, recognizable and expe-
dient process to govern voluntary cleanups of contaminated sites.93
Only by instilling confidence in the brownfields initiative on the
part of potential purchasers or developers will brownfield sites be-
come more competitive with the pristine greenfield sites, thus en-
couraging redevelopment of contaminated properties.94
Many of the brownfield amendment proposals include provi-
sions to induce states to play an active role in recycling brownfields
. 91. Id. at 31. If cleanup standards are based on the prospective reuse of the
property, it is sensible to release owners from liability, allowing market forces to
take over once those cleanup standards are satisfied. Id. "[The] [p]roposed reme-
dies would consider the reasonably foreseeable use of land, groundwater, and
other resources." Daily Environment Report, July 18, 1995 (statement of
Superfund reform principles and cover letter from Representative Michael Oxley,
Chairman of Commerce, Trade, Hazardous Materials Panel). Reasonably foresee-
able uses would be determined by considering a number of factors including: (1)
current use of the property; (2) site analysis and surrounding land use patterns;
(3) current zoning requirements and protected future land uses; and (4) input
from community assistance groups, elected municipal and county officials and
PRPs. Id.
92. See generally Grayson, supra note 80 (commenting that even if landowner is
not liable under CERCLA, he may still be liable under state or local law). See also
Brian Hill & Joanne Denworth, Report on Reuse of Industrial Sites Roundtables,
Pennsylvania Environmental Council Roundtable Discussion (Oct. 14-22, 1993).
The roundtable identified several constraints to the reuse of industrial and
commercial sites: (1) uncertainty relating to cleanup standards under both state
and federal law; (2) unending liability; (3) private investment favoring greenfields;
(4) reluctance of private lenders to invest in former industrial sites; and (5) high
remediation costs. Id. at 2.
93. Urban Reclamation Hearings, supra note 79, at 22 (statement of Charles
Bartsch). Voluntary cleanups are essential to any brownfield redevelopment initia-
tive if site reuse is to be viable on a national scale. Id.
94. Id. at 86 (statement of Timothy Fields). Under one proposal, purchasers
would be exempt as owners under CERCLA if:
(1) active disposal of hazardous substances occurred before purchase of
the property,
(2) the purchaser performs a thorough examination of the site's envi-
ronmental condition,
(3) the purchaser cooperates with efforts to remediate the property, and
maintain the remedy,
(4) the purchaser evinces due care to stop the on-going release of haz-
ardous materials, in order to prevent future threatened release and to
prevent or limit human or natural resource exposure to previously re-
leased hazardous materials, and
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located within their boundaries.95 These proposals seek to en-
courage the development of credible, EPA-certified, state voluntary
cleanup programs by allowing individual states to define and make
final approval decisions on remediations at low and medium prior-
ity sites.96 Giving states the power to create explicit parameters for
the voluntary cleanup process will remove significant roadblocks to
redevelopment while at the same time providing an effective mech-
anism for promoting the cleanup of thousands of mildly-contami-
nated sites.97
IV. PENNSYLVANIA BROWNFIELDS LEGISLATION
In May 1995, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed three com-
panion acts: (1) The Land Recycling and Environmental Remedi-
ation Standards Act (Act 2);98 (2) The Economic Development
Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability Protection
Act (Act 3);99 and (3) The Industrial Sites Environmental Assess-
ment Act (Act 4).100 The acts have been heralded as the most com-
95. Id. (statement of Representative McHale). The proposals list several re-
quirements for any state program, including the following: (1) adequate public
participation; (2) availability of technical assistance to parties conducting a volun-
tary cleanup; (3) oversight and enforcement authority; (4) provisions with cove-
nants not to sue, contribution protection, certification of completion, "no further
action" letters or other mechanisms to ensure finality of the cleanup process; and
(5) linkage between the extent of cleanup required at the site and the intended
use of the property. Id.
96. Id. (statement of Representative PeterJ. Visclosky).
97. See id.
98. The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act (Act
2) §§ 101-908, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.101-.908 (West Supp. 1996). Act 2
is the primary law creating a realistic framework for setting environmental cleanup
standards. Department of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling
Highlights and Questions (last modified Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.pader.gov/dep/
deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>. The legislation provides the fol-
lowing: (1) incentives to encourage voluntary development and implementation
of cleanup plans for abandoned sites without using taxpayer funds; (2) releases
from liability when cleanup standards are met; (3) deadlines for Department ac-
tions; and (4) funding for environmental studies and cleanups through the Indus-
trial Sites Cleanup Fund. Id.
99. The Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmen-
tal Liability Protection Act (Act 3) §§ 1-14, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6027.1-.14
(West Supp. 1996). Act 3 limits environmental liability of those involved in
redeveloping and financing recycled industrial sites. Department of Environmen-
tal Protection Homepage: Land Recycling Highlights and Questions (last modified
Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.pader.gov/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/
default.htm>.
100. The Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act (Act 4) §§ 1-5, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996). The General Assembly passed
Act 4 because abandoned property was not being used or reused because the costs
associated with conducting an environmental assessment of the property were too
high. Franklin L. Kury, Esq., Presentation at the Northeast PA Environmental Fo-
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prehensive program in the nation to encourage the cleanup and
reuse of industrial sites.10 1 The legislature's goal was to develop a
faster and easier way to encourage the voluntary cleanup and reuse
of contaminated properties without risking the environment's in-
tegrity. 102 The three companion acts accomplish this goal, creating
an innovative break from the past. In particular, Act 2 sets forth a
new framework, creating three distinctive cleanup standards.103
A. The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation
Standards Act
Act 2 is the cornerstone of Pennsylvania's three bill legislative
package. 10 4 "[I] t establishes over-arching legal principles to accom-
plish the dual objectives of encouraging the reuse of existing indus-
trial sites and establishing environmental remediation standards to
rum, (Sept. 27, 1995) in The Liability Issue, [hereinafter The Liability Issue] (pre-
pared by the Environmental Law Group at Reed, Smith, Shaw & McKay).
Act 4 allocates funds for grants to conduct assessments so that industrial sites
will be used or reused to their fullest potential. Id. To provide these grants, Act 4
creates the Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Fund. See title 35, § 6028.3.
Annually, and upon the Governor's approval, up to two million dollars will be
allocated to the fund for environmental assessments in distressed communities.
Department of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling Highlights
and Questions (last modified Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.pader.gov/dep/deputate/
airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>.
101. Pennsylvania Launches Land RecyclingProgram, PR Newswire,July 19, 1995.
By taking a practical and informed approach to liability and cleanup issues, the
legislation removes obstacles to the cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated
industrial sites while ensuring the health and safety of Pennsylvanians. Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling Highlights and Ques-
tions (last modified Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.pader.gov/dep/deputate/
airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>. Governor Ridge commented that this new
program will succeed where earlier measures failed because it adopts a more prac-
tical, realistic approach to industrial site cleanups. Pennsylvania Launches Land Re-
cycling Program, PR Newswire, July 19, 1995. Confident that Pennsylvania's
brownfields initiative will be a tremendous success, Governor Ridge stated "[w]e
are setting a standard which I'm sure many other states will follow." Id.
102. Department of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling
Highlights and Questions (last modified Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.pader.gov/dep/
deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>. Under previous regulations, the
DEP set unattainable standards and required landowners to jump through bureau-
cratic hoops without regard to the cost, ordering DEP approval at every step of the
way. Id. The new system specifically rejects the previous administration's policy of
mandating pristine cleanups as the only possible cleanup standard. The Liability
Issue, supra note 100. The new system adopts Governor Ridge's pragmatic environ-
mental remediation and liability protection policy. Id.
103. Id.
104. Marc E. Gold, Esq., Remarks prepared for the Brownfields Site Redevel-
opment and Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Act Seminar (Jan. 30, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Land Recycling Act Seminar], at 3 (on file with author).
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enable PRPs to obtain legal liability protection."10 5 To this end, the
program seeks to accomplish three basic goals: (1) restore industry
for productive use, thereby providing jobs for Pennsylvanians; (2)
clean up sites in order to make them safe for their communities
and workers; and (3) protect farmland and other undeveloped
property from unnecessary development.10 6 By achieving these
goals, legislators hope to encourage the productive redevelopment
of brownfields, thus enabling Pennsylvania's job creators to develop
new opportunities for the state's workforce. 0 7
Act 2 represents a fundamental shift in state environmental
policy on the cleanup and reuse of industrial sites.' 08 The new
framework includes three cleanup standards which are available to
owners and prospective purchasers: (1) the background stan-
dard; 109 (2) the statewide health standard; 10 and (3) the site-spe-
105. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). "For the first time remediation procedures
and standards appear in a state statute rather than in regulations developed under
narrow regulatory programs or agency policies drafted and implemented without
public input or review." Id.
106. Pennsylvania Launches Land Recycling Program, PR Newswire,July 19, 1995.
The three companion acts seek to accomplish these goals by:
(1) creating a realistic framework for setting cleanup standards
based on health and environmental risks,
(2) setting up clear processes to standardize state approval of
cleanup plans with deadlines for action,
(3) ending the never-ending cleanup liability for sites once they are
made safe, and
(4) providing opportunities for public review and input into setting
cleanup standards.
Id.
107. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Signs Industrial Cleanup
Agreement for Philadelphia Property, PR Newswire, June 12, 1995.
108. As We See It, HARRISBURG PATIOT NEWS, Nov. 24, 1995, at Opinion and
Editorial. In the past, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(DEP) treated landowners like criminals even if the landowners volunteered to
clean up a site where they did not contribute to the contamination. Id. Prior to
the passage of Acts 2, 3 and 4, the state took a more stringent and inflexible ap-
proach to cleaning up contaminated sites. Under the old system, owners and pro-
spective purchasers were required to remediate a site as much as possible, with
costs mostly irrelevant in determining what amount of remediation was feasible.
Id. "[Legislation was] inadequate because [it] lacked any specific cleanup stan-
dards .... impeding the use of realistic remediation strategies to achieve final-
ity.. . ." Id. at 2. Additionally, unless the-background standards achieved predated
any human activity on the property, it was impossible to be released from liability.
Id.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West Supp. 1996). In order to qualify
for liability protection under the background standard, a person must satisfy the
following criteria:
(a) Standard. Persons selecting the background standard shall meet
background for each regulated substance in each environmental
medium.
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cific standard." In order to qualify for liability protection, any
(b) Attainment. Final certification that a site or portion of a site meets
the background standard shall be documented in the following manner:
(1) Attainment of the background standard shall be demonstrated by
collection and analysis of representative samples from environmental
media of concern, including soils and groundwater in aquifers in the
area where the contamination occurs through the application of statis-
tical tests set forth in regulation or, if no regulations have been
adopted, in a demonstration of a mathematically valid application of
statistical tests. The Department of Environmental Resources shall
also recognize those methods of attainment demonstration generally
recognized as appropriate for that particular remediation.
Id.
110. See id. § 6026.303. Under Section 303(a), the Environmental Quality
Board (EQB) is directed to promulgate statewide health standards. Id. The sec-
tion provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Standard.-The Environmental Quality Board shall promulgate State-
wide health standards for regulated substances for each environmental
medium. The standards shall include any existing numerical residential
and nonresidential health-based standards adopted by the department
and by the Federal Government by regulation or statute, and health advi-
sory levels. For those health-based standards not already established by
regulation or statute, the Environmental Quality Board shall by regula-
tion propose residential and nonresidential standards as medium-specific
concentrations within 12 months of the effective date of this act. The
Environmental Quality Board shall also promulgate along with the stan-
dards the methods used to calculate the standards. Standards adopted
under this section shall be no more stringent than those standards
adopted by the Federal Government.
Id.
111. See id. § 6026.304. The section mandates the cleanup standards for vari-
ous types of contaminants in different types of environmental mediums. Id. The
cleanup standards provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) Carcinogens.-For known or suspected carcinogens, soil and
groundwater cleanup standards shall be established at exposures which
represent an excess upper-bound lifetime risk of between 1 in. 10,000 and
1 in 1,000,000. The cumulative excess risk to exposed populations, in-
cluding sensitive subgroups, shall not be greater than 1 in 10,000.
(c) Systemic toxicants.-For systemic toxicants, soil and groundwater
cleanup standards shall represent levels to which the human population
could be exposed on a daily basis without appreciable risk of deleterious
effect to the exposed population. Where several systemic toxicants affect
the same target organ or act by the same method of toxicity, the hazard
index shall not exceed one. The hazard index is the sum of the hazard
quotients for multiple systemic toxicants acting through a single-medium
exposure pathway or through multiple-media exposure pathways.
(d) Groundwater.-Cleanup standards for groundwater shall be estab-
lished in accordance with subsections (b) and (c) using the following
considerations:
(1) For groundwater in aquifers, site-specific standards shall be estab-
lished using the following procedures:
(i) The current and probable future use of groundwater shall be
identified and protected. Groundwater that has a background to-
tal dissolved solids content greater than 2,500 milligrams per liter
or is not capable of transmitting water to a pumping well in usable
25
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person'1 2 proposing to, or required to respond to the "release"113
of a regulated substance must satisfy one of these three
standards. 114
and sustainable quantities shall not be considered a current or po-
tential source of drinking water.
(ii) Site-specific sources of contaminants and potential receptors
shall be identified.
(iii) Natural environmental conditions affecting the fate and
transport of contaminants, such as natural attenuation, shall be de-
termined by appropriate scientific methods.
(2) Groundwater not in aquifers shall be evaluated using current or
probable future exposure scenarios. Appropriate management ac-
tions shall be instituted at the point of exposure where a person is
exposed to groundwater by ingestion or other avenues to protect
human health and the environment. This shall not preclude taking
appropriate source management actions by the responsible party to
achieve the equivalent level of protection.
(e) Soil.-Concentrations of regulated substances in soil shall not exceed val-
ues calculated in accordance with subsections (b) and (c) based on human
ingestion of soil where direct contact exposure to the soil may reasonably oc-
cur; values calculated to protect groundwater in aquifers at levels determined
in accordance with subsections (b), (c) and (d); and values calculated to sat-
isfy the requirements of subsection (g) with respect to discharges or releases
to surface water or emissions to the outdoor air. Such determinations shall
take into account the effects of institutional and engineering controls, if any,
and shall be based on sound scientific principles, including fate and transport
analysis of the migration of a regulated substance in relation to receptor
exposures.
Id.
112. Act 2 defines person in the same broad manner as proscribed under
CERCLA: "[a]n individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, authority, nonprofit corporation, interstate
body or other legal entity which is recognized by law as the subject of rights and
duties. The term includes the Federal Government, State government, political
subdivisions and Commonwealth instrumentalities." Id. For a comparison of CER-
CIA's definition of "person," see supra note 24.
113. See title 35, § 6026.103. The statute defines release as:
[the] [s]pilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, dis-
charging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing of a regu-
lated substance into the environment in a manner not authorized by the
Department of Environmental Resources. The term includes the aban-
donment or discarding of barrels, containers, vessels and other recepta-
cles containing a regulated substance.
Id.
114. Id. § 6026.301. The section provides as follows:
(a) Standards.-Any person who proposes or is required to respond to
the release of a regulated substance at a site and who wants to be eligible
for the cleanup liability protection under Chapter 5 shall select and attain
compliance with one or more of the following environmental standards
when conducting remediation activities:
(1) a background standard which achieves background as further
specified in section 302;
(2) a Statewide health standard adopted by the Environmental Qual-
ity Board which achieves a uniform Statewide health-based level so
that any substantial present or probable future risk to human health
and the environment is eliminated as specified in section 303; or
26




Any "responsible person"11 5 seeking to attain the background
standard for a particular piece of property must first submit a "No-
tice of Intent to Remediate" (NIR) with the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (DEP).116 In order to establish
(3) a site-specific standard which achieves remediation levels based
on a site-specific risk assessment so that any substantial present or
probable future risk to human health and the environment is elimi-
nated or reduced to protective levels based upon the present or cur-
rently planned future use of the property comprising the site as
specified in section 304.
(b) Combination of standards.-A person may use a combination of the
remediation standards to implement a site remediation plan and may
propose to use the site-specific standard whether or not efforts have been
made to attain the background or Statewide health standard.
(c) Determining attainment.-For the purposes of determining attain-
ment of any one or a combination of remediation standards, the concen-
tration of a regulated substance shall not be required to be less than the
practical quantitation limit for a regulated substance as determined from
time to time by the EPA. The department may, in consultation with the
board, establish by regulation procedures for determining attainment of
remediation standards when practical quantitation limits set by the EPA
have a health risk that is greater than the risk levels set in sections 303(c)
and 304(b) and (c). The department shall not establish procedures for
determining attainment of remediation standards where maximum con-
taminant levels and health advisory levels have already been established
for regulated substances.
Id.
115. Title 35, § 6026.103. The term "responsible person" shall have:
the same meaning as given to it in the act of October 18, 1988 (P.L. 756,
No. 108), known as the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, and shall include a
person subject to enforcement actions for substances covered by the act
of June 22, 1937 (P.L. 1987, No. 394), known as the Clean Streams Law,
the act of January 8, 1960 (1959 P.L. 2119, No. 787), known as the Air
Pollution Control Act, the act ofJuly 7, 1980 (P.L. 380, No. 97), known as
the Solid Waste Management Act, the act ofJuly 13, 1988 (P.L. 525, No.
93), referred to as the Infectious and Chemotherapeutic Waste Law, and
the act ofJuly 6, 1989 (P.L. 169, No. 32), known as the Storage Tank and
Spill Prevention Act.
Id.
116. Subsequent to the passage of the three acts, the Department of Environ-
mental Resources (DER) became the Department of Environmental Protection.
While the act refers to the DER, any references in this Comment will refer to the
agency by its current title (DEP).
The NIR is the initial notice requirement of Act 2. Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling Technical Reference Manual,
Chapter V, Public Participation, Notifications, and Fees (visited Nov. 16, 1996)
<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/manual/
manualex.htm>. The purpose of the NIR is to provide notice of proposed
remediation of a site. Id. The notice of intent must include the following informa-
tion: (1) a description of the site; (2) a listing of all contaminants located on the
site; (3) a description of the intended future use of the property (including em-
ployment opportunities, housing, open space, recreation, etc.); and (4) the pro-
posed remediation measures. Id.
19971
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compliance with the background standard, a responsible party must
demonstrate that the level of contamination existing at the site
does not exceed levels in the surrounding area for "regulated sub-
stances."117 While "institutional controls"118 may not be used to at-
tain the background standard, they may be used subsequent to
remediation efforts. 11 9
2. Statewide Health Standard
In order to attain the statewide health standard, a person must
submit a NIR with the DEP, as well as with the municipality in which
the site is located. 120 The standards for satisfying the statewide
health standard are those standards adopted, by regulation, by the
Environmental Quality Board (EQB)*121 This standard is divided
into two components: (1) any existing numerical residential and
nonresidential health-based standards adopted by the DEP and the
federal government by regulation or statute;1 22 and (2) where there
are no health-based standards established by regulation or statute,
the EQB is directed to propose, by regulation, residential and non-
residential standards as "medium-specific concentrations," 12 3 sub-
ject, however, to certain statutorily proscribed requirements.
117. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SOURCES, BIL ANALYSIs: SENATE BIL 1, 1, 4 (1995). Responsible persons may es-
tablish compliance with the background standard by taking samples of the various
environmental mediums. Id.
118. Title 35, § 6026.103. "Institutional controls" are defined as: "[a] mea-
sure undertaken to limit or prohibit certain activities that may interfere with the
integrity of a remedial action or result in exposure to regulated substances at a site.
These include, but are not limited to, fencing or restrictions on the future use of
the site." Id.
119. Id. § 6026.302(b) (4).
120. Id. § 6026.303(h)(1)-(4). Like the background standard, the statewide
health standard includes the sixty day review period provision as well as the
"deemed approved" provision. Id.
121. See id. § 6026.303(a). For the relevant textual language of section
303(a), see supra note 110.
122. See id. § 6026.303(a).
123. Id. A "medium-specific concentration" is "[t]he concentration associ-
ated with a specific environmental medium for potential risk exposures." Id.
§ 6026.103. The EQB shall prescribe the medium-specific standards subject to the
following requirements:
(b) Medium-specific concentrations.-The following requirements shall
be used to establish a medium-specific concentration:
(1) Any regulated discharge into surface water occurring during or
after attainment of the Statewide health standard shall comply with
applicable laws and regulations relating to surface water discharges.
(2) Any regulated emissions to the outdoor air occurring during or
after attainment of the Statewide health standard shall comply with
applicable laws and regulations relating to emissions into the outdoor
air.
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A major concern with Act 2 is the absence of any protocols or
procedures under the notice requirements to ensure compliance
with the background and statewide health standards.12 4 Under sec-
tions 302(e) and 303(h), responsible parties need only file the fol-
lowing: (1) a notice of intent to remediate; 125 (2) notice of
submission of final report;126 and (3) a final report.12 7 Moreover, if
the person submits a final report within ninety days demonstrating
attainment of either the background or statewide health standard, a
(3) The concentration of a regulated substance in groundwater in aq-
uifers used or currently planned to be used for drinking water or for
agricultural purposes shall comply with the maximum contaminant
level or health advisory level established for drinking water. If the
groundwater at the site has naturally occurring background total dis-
solved solids concentrations greater than 2,500 milligrams per liter,
the remediation standard for a regulated substance dissolved in the
groundwater may be adjusted by multiplying the medium-specific con-
centration for groundwater in aquifers by 100. The resulting value
becomes the maximum contaminant level for groundwater.
(4) For the residential standard, the concentration of a regulated sub-
stance in soil shall not exceed either the direct contact soil medium-
specific concentration based on residential exposure factors within a
depth of up to 15 feet from the existing ground surface or the soil-to-
groundwater pathway numeric value throughout the soil column ....
(5) For the nonresidential standard, the concentration of a regulated
substance in soil shall not exceed either the direct contact soil me-
dium-specific concentration based on nonresidential exposure factors
within a depth of up to 15 feet from the existing ground surface using
valid scientific methods reflecting worker exposure or the soil-to-
groundwater pathway numeric value determined in accordance with
paragraph (4).
Id.
124. Memorandum from Joanne R. Denworth, President, Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Council (August 17, 1995) [hereinafter Denworth Memorandum] (on
file with author).
125. Title 35, § 6026.302(e) (1) (i). This section provides in part that "[a] no-
tice of intent to remediate shall be submitted to the department [of planned
remediation activities] .... " Id. See also id. § 6026.303(h) (1) (i) (dictating same
notice requirements).
126. Id. § 6026.302(e) (2). This section provides, in part, that "[n]otice of the
submission of the final report demonstrating attainment of background standard
shall be given to the municipality in which the remediation site is located...." Id.
See also id. § 6026.303(h) (2) (dictating same notice requirement for background
standard).
127. See id. §§ 6026.302(b) (2), 6026.303(e) (2). The act does not require
prior approval to initiate remediation. Land Recycling Act Seminar, supra note
105, at 5. The act, however, does require responsible parties to submit the notice
of intent to the municipality in which the site is located as well as publication in a
local newspaper. See title 35, §§ 6026.302 (e) (ii), 6026.303(h) (1) (ii). Additionally,
when reporting remediation efforts to the DEP, the final version must contain
a detailed description of the process taken to reach the background standard,
as well as the reasons for choosing the various sources for testing. Id.
§§ 6026.302(b) (2) (ii), 6026.303(e) (2). If the DEP does not respond within the
sixty day time period, the final report is "deemed approved." Id.
§§ 6026.302(e) (3), 6026.303(h) (3).
19971
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notice of intent to remediate under sections 302(e) (1) or
303(h) (1) is not required.1 28 Additionally, under the background
standard, if the adjacent site is contaminated, and the owner is re-
sponsible, the owner is still only required to remediate up to the
property line in order to be relieved of any future liability.1 29
3. Site-Specific Standard
The goal of the site-specific standard is to evaluate a site in
order to provide a "safe, productive cleanup standard unique to the
site."130 While the site-specific approach offers more flexibility to
the responsible person, as compared to the background or state-
wide health standard, it imposes more statutorily prescribed re-
quirements.131 After providing a "notice of intent"13 2 to use the
site-specific standard, responsible parties must develop and submit:
(1) a remedial investigation report;133 (2) a risk assessment; 13
128. Id. § 6026.302(e)(4). See also § 6026.303(h)(4) (providing same notice
requirements).
129. See The Brownfields Initiative, supra note 79 (stating Pennsylvania's back-
ground standard and release of owners from liability for remediation). Critics con-
tend these provisions will promote development of greenfields rather than the
redevelopment of brownfields. Joanne R. Denworth, ELI draft article, (1995)
[hereinafter ELI draft article] (unpublished draft, on file with author).
130. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Homepage:
Land Recycling Technical Reference Manual, Chapter III, Remediation Standards (vis-
ited Nov. 16, 1996) <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/lan-
drecy/manual/manualex.htm>. The information in this report includes all
pathways of exposure, and an evaluation of the present and future use of the site.
Id.
131. Id. The site-specific standard requires the accumulation of additional
information, requiring more time and effort and additional reviews to be filed with
the DEP, municipalities and the public. Id.
132. See title 35, § 6026.304(n). The responsible person selecting the site-spe-
cific standard must submit a notice of intent to remediate to: (1) the DEP; (2) the
municipality in which the site is located; and (3) a summary of the notice of intent
to the general public. Id. Additionally, the notices required under section
6026.304(n) must "include a 30-day public and municipal comment period during
which the municipality may request to be involved in the development" of the
site's remediation plan. Id. § 6026.304(n) (ii).
133. Id. § 6026.304(1) (1). The remedial investigation report must include:
(i) Documentation and descriptions of procedures and conclusions
from the site investigation to characterize the nature, extent, direction,
rate of movement, volume and composition of regulated substances.
(ii) The concentration of regulated substances in environmental media
of concern, including summaries of sampling methodology and analytical
results, and information obtained from attempts to comply with the back-
ground or Statewide health standards, if any.
(iii) A description of the existing or potential public benefits of the use
or reuse of the property for employment opportunities, housing, open
space, recreation or other uses.
(iv) A fate and transport analysis may be included in the report to
demonstrate that no present or future exposure pathways exist.
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(3)cleanup plans;135 and (4) a final report, 5 6 as outlined in the
Act. In addition, a responsible person must submit a final remedia-
tion plan which includes remediation alternatives and a final
remedy. 1 3 7
(v) If no exposure pathways exist, a risk assessment report and cleanup
plan are not required and no remedy is required to be proposed or
completed.
Id.
134. Id. § 6026.304(1) (2). If required, the risk assessment report must:
describe [ ] the potential adverse effects under both current and planned
future conditions caused by the presence of a regulated substance in the
absence of any further control, remediation or mitigation measures. A
baseline risk assessment report is not required where it is determined that
a specific remediation measure can be implemented to attain the site-
specific standard.
Id.
135. Id. § 6026.304(1) (3). The statute requires a cleanup plan which:
evaluates the relative abilities and effectiveness of potential remedies to
achieve the requirements for remedies described in subsection (k) when
considering the evaluation factors described in subsection (j). The plan
shall select a remedy which achieves the requirements for remedies de-
scribed in subsection (k). The department may require a further evalua-
tion of the selected remedy or an evaluation of one or more additional
remedies in response to comments received from the community sur-
rounding the site as a result of the community involvement plan estab-
lished in subsection (o) which are based on the factors described in
subsection (j) or as a result of its own analysis which are based on the
evaluation factors described in subsection (j).
Id.
136. Id. § 6026.304(1) (4). The final report must "demonstrat[e] that the ap-
proved remedy has been completed in accordance with the cleanup plan." Id.
137. Id. § 6026.3040). The final remedy should consider each of the follow-
ing factors:
(1) Long-term risks and effectiveness of the proposed remedy that in-
cludes an evaluation of:
(i) The magnitude of risks remaining after completion of the reme-
dial action.
(ii) The type, degree and duration of postremediation care re-
quired, including, but not limited to, operation and maintenance,
monitoring, inspections and reports and their frequencies or other
activities which will be necessary to protect human health and the
environment.
(iii) Potential for exposure of human and environmental receptors
to regulated substances remaining at the site.
(iv) Long-term reliability of any engineering and voluntary institu-
tional controls.
(v) Potential need for repair, maintenance or replacement of com-
ponents of the remedy.
(vi) Time to achieve cleanup standards.
(2) Reduction of the toxicity, mobility or volume of regulated sub-
stances, including the amount of regulated substances that will be re-
moved, contained, treated or destroyed, the degree of expected
reduction in toxicity, mobility or volume and the type, quantity, toxicity
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A significant difference between the background and statewide
health standards and the site-specific standard is the heightened
notice requirements prescribed under the provisions of the site-spe-
cific standard.138 Under the background and statewide health stan-
dards, no approval is necessary to initiate remediation activities
because the DEP will only approve the final report after remedia-
tion at the site is complete. 139 In contrast, the site-specific standard
requires notice and review each time a report is submitted to the
DEP.140 Furthermore, under the site-specific standard, a thirty day
(3) Short-term risks and effectiveness of the remedy, including the short-
term risks that may be posed to the community, workers or the environ-
ment during implementation of the remedy and the effectiveness and
reliability of protective measures to address short-term risks.
(4) The ease or difficulty of implementing the proposed remedy, includ-
ing commercially available remedial measures which are BADCT, degree
of difficulty associated with constructing the remedy, expected opera-
tional reliability, available capacity and location of needed treatment,
storage and disposal services for wastes, time to initiate remedial efforts
and approvals necessary to implement the remedial efforts.
(5) The cost of the remediation measure, including capital costs, opera-
tion and maintenance costs, net present value of capital and operation
and maintenance costs and the total costs and effectiveness of the system.
(6) The incremental health and economic benefits shall be evaluated by
comparing those benefits to the incremental health and economic costs
associated with implementation of remedial measures.
Id.
138. Id. § 6026.304(n). For the notice requirements of section 6026.304(n),
see supra note 132.
139. Compare tide 35, § 6026.302(e), 6026.303(h) with tide 35, § 6026.304(n)
(providing respective notice and review provisions for background and statewide
health standards).
140. See tide 35, § 6026.304(n) (2). This section reads as follows:
The following notice and review provisions apply each time a remedial
investigation report, risk assessment report, cleanup plan and final report
demonstrating compliance with the site-specific standard is submitted to
the department:
(i) When the report or plan is submitted to the department, a notice of
its submission shall be provided to the municipality in which the site is
located, and a notice summarizing the findings and recommendations of
the report or plan shall be published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion serving the area in which the site is located. If the municipality re-
quested to be involved in the development of the remediation and reuse
plans, the reports and plans shall also include the comments submitted
by the municipality, the public and the responses from the persons pre-
paring the reports and plans.
(ii) The department shall review the report or plan within no more than
90 days of its receipt or notify the person submitting the report of defi-
ciencies. If the department does not respond with deficiencies within 90
days, the report shall be deemed approved.
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public and municipal comment period is triggered each time a re-
port is submitted by a responsible person. 141
Similar to the other two remediation standards, the site-specific
standard has come under intense scrutiny. Specifically, concerns
have been raised regarding the thirty day comment period.' 42 As
section 304(n) (1) (ii) is worded, citizens have no direct involve-
ment.143 Because the municipality is the only entity entitled to re-
quest a public participation plan, any interested citizen must
convince the municipality to make such a request.1 " Therefore, if
an industrial use is suggested for a site and no objection or request
is made to the municipality, the person need only clean the site for
an industrial use, even if no such use is planned.145
Critics contend that "while restricted use, risk-based standards
are appropriate in some situations, they should be used spar-
ingly." 146 Critics advocate a cleanup approach which permits
remediation to a particular standard only if the projected use for
141. Id. § 6026.304(n) (1) (ii). If the public or the municipality does, in fact,
wish to become involved in the remediation process, the person must actively initi-
ate a public involvement plan. Id. The municipality, however, is the only entity
permitted to request the public involvement plan. Id. Additionally, use of the site-
specific standards requires:
develop[ment] [of] a public involvement plan which involves the public
in the cleanup and use of the property if the municipality requests to be
involved in the remediation and reuse plans for the site. The plan shall
propose measures to involve the public in the development and review of
the remedial investigation report, risk assessment report, cleanup plan
and final report. Depending on the site involved, measures may include
techniques such as developing a proactive community information and
consultation program that includes door step notice of activities related
to remediation, public meetings and roundtable discussions, convenient
locations where documents related to a remediation can be made avail-
able to the public and designating a single contact person to whom com-
munity residents can ask questions; the formation of a community-based
group which is used to solicit suggestions and comments on the various
reports required by this section; and, if needed, the retention of trained,
independent third parties to facilitate meetings and discussions and per-
form mediation services.
Id. § 6026.304(o).
142. Land Recycling Act Seminar, supra note 104, at 5. Critics contend that
the thirty day period is much more than a comment period because after the time
has lapsed, there is presumably no further opportunity for the municipality or the
public to object or request to become part of the process of developing a cleanup
plan for the site. Id.
143. See Denworth Memorandum, supra note 124. For the textual language of
section 304(n)(1)(ii), see supra note 140.
144. Denworth Memorandum, supra note 124.
145. Land Recycling Act Seminar, supra note 104.
146. Denworth, ELI draft article, supra note 129, at 2.
1997]
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the site is commensurate with that particular standard.1 47 Only
under this type of carefully monitored scheme, critics contend, is it
appropriate to release owners from liability.148 Otherwise, the
burden of any future cleanup will fall on prospective owners, once
again creating a disincentive to choose brownfields over
greenfields. 149
4. Special Industrial Areas
Under limited situations, persons may select the special indus-
trial areas standard.15 0 The objective of this standard is to stimulate
interest in purchasing and redeveloping property in designated dis-
tressed areas by clearly defining and limiting the environmental ob-
ligations of a prospective purchaser.15 1 Entering into an agreement
with the DEP, an innocent prospective purchaser may obtain liabil-
ity protection by taking actions necessary to address any "immedi-
ate, direct or imminent threats to public health or the environment
.... "152 Additionally, prospective sites can only include those used
for industrial activities where: (1) no financially responsible person
can be found;153 or (2) the land is located in a designated enter-
prise zone. 154
147. Id. Within this scheme, the community and the municipality are in-
volved in the process of establishing a restricted use cleanup plan. Id.
148. Id. As the law currently stands, municipalities should consider rezoning
industrial properties that they want upgraded to a higher use now (such as for
residential purposes), to prevent owners from cleaning a site to an industrial stan-
dard, and relieving themselves of a further obligation of remediating the site in the
future. Id. Otherwise, the state will release these owners from liability, once again
leaving any future cleanup responsibilities squarely in the hands of future owners
or municipalities. Id.
149. Id.
150. In order to qualify as a special industrial area, the property must be des-
ignated as a "special site." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305(a) (West Supp.
1996). This section applies to:
property used for industrial activities where there is no financially viable
responsible person to clean up contamination or for land located within
enterprise zones designated pursuant to the requirements of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs, the review procedures of this section shall
apply for persons conducting remediation activities who did not cause or
contribute to contamination on the property. Any environmental
remediation undertaken pursuant to this section shall comply with one or
more of the standards established in this chapter.
Id.
151. Land Recycling Act Seminar, supra note 104, at 8-9.
152. Id.
153. See title 35, § 6026.305(a). For the relevant textual language of section
6026.305(a), see supra note 150.
154. See title 35, § 6026.305(a). In order to qualify for the Enterprise Zone
Program, the applying municipality must be recognized by the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Community Affairs (DCA) as a financially disadvantaged community.
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To qualify for the special industrial areas standard, a person
must first file a baseline remedial investigation report. 155 Once the
baseline report is approved, the person must file an NIR with the
DEP, the municipality in which the site is located and the public. 156
The provisions of section 305, like those for the site-specific stan-
dards, call for a thirty day public and municipal comment pe-
riod. 157  If the DEP does not: (1) review the baseline
environmental report; (2) consider the comments received; and
(3) report any deficiencies within ninety days, the report is deemed
approved.158
5. Cleanup Liability Protection
The liability protection provision of Chapter five is by far the
most significant aspect of Act 2. Under section 6026.501 (a), "[a] ny
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Homepage: Land Recycling
Technical Reference Manual Chapter III, Remediation Standards (visited Nov. 16,
1996) <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/
manual/manualex.htm>. Cleanups in special industrial areas must meet the fol-
lowing requirements:
(1) cleanups may utilize treatment, storage, containment or control
methods, or any combination of the above;
(2) cleanups must address all containerized waste at the property in ac-
cordance with applicable regulations,
(3) soil that is available for direct contact must meet human health pro-
tection goals,
(4) removal of any uncontainerized waste posing an imminent, immedi-
ate or direct threat, based on the plans for reuse of property;
(5) if groundwater is to be used, it must be remediated so that it is safe
for its intended use.
Id.
155. See title 35, § 6026.305(b). This section states that a baseline remedial
investigation:
shall be conducted on the property based on a work plan approved by the
department, and a baseline environmental report shall be submitted to
the department to establish a reference point showing existing contami-
nation on the site. The report shall describe the proposed remediation
measures to be undertaken within the limits of cleanup liability found in
section 502. The report shall also include a description of the existing or
potential public benefits of the use or reuse of the property for employ-
ment opportunities, housing, open space, recreation or other use.
Id.
156. Id. § 6026.305(c).
157. Id. § 6026.305(c) (2).
158. Id. § 6026.305(d). The subsection reads as follows:
[n]o later than 90 days after the completed environmental report is sub-
mitted for review, the department shall determine whether the report
adequately identifies the environmental hazards and risks posed by the
site. The comments obtained as a result of a public involvement plan
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person demonstrating compliance with the environmental remedia-
tion standards set forth in Chapter 3 shall be relieved of further
liability for the remediation of the site . . "159 The release from
liability applies to: (1) current or future owners;160 (2) develop-
ers;161 (3) successors or assigns of any person with liability protec-
tion;162 and (4) public utilities. 163 Additionally, a person will not be
held responsible simply by virtue of conducting environmental ac-
tivities, such as an environmental assessment, on the site. 64 Rather,
in special industrial areas, liability protection extends to parties who
engage in an environmental agreement with DEP pursuant to sec-
tion 6026.305.165
159. Id. § 6026.501 (a). Section 6026.505, however, leaves open the possibility
of future liability under certain circumstances. See id. § 6026.505. The "reopener"
provision reestablishes liability if the DEP can establish that:
(1) fraud was committed in demonstrating attainment of a standard at
the site that resulted in avoiding the need for further cleanup of the site;
(2) new information confirms the existence of an area of previously un-
known contamination which contains regulated substances that have
been shown to exceed the standards applied to previous remediation at
the site;
(3) the remediation method failed to meet one or a combination of the
three cleanup standards;
(4) the level of risk is increased beyond the acceptable risk range at a site
due to substantial changes in exposure conditions, such as in a change in
land use from nonresidential to a residential use, or new information is
obtained about a regulated substance associated with the site which re-
vises exposure assumptions beyond the acceptable range. Any person
who changes the use of the property causing the level of risk to increase
beyond the acceptable risk range shall be required by the department to
undertake additional remediation measures under the provisions of this
act; or
(5) (i) the release occurred after the effective date of this act on a site
not used for industrial activity prior to the effective date of this act;
(ii) the remedy relied in whole or in part upon institutional or engi-
neering controls instead of treatment or removal of contamination;
and
(iii) treatment, removal or destruction has become technically and
economically feasible on that part.
Id.
160. Id. § 6026.501 (a) (1).
161. Id. § 6026.501 (a) (2).
162. Id. § 6026.501 (a) (3).
163. Id. § 6026.501(a)(4).
164. Id. § 6026.501(b). Section 6026.501(b), however, does not provide any
relief from liability to a person who declines "to exercise due diligence in perform-
ing an environmental assessment or transaction screen." Id. Section 6026.504,
however, provides for the imposition of "new liability" for "contamination later
caused by that person on a site which has demonstrated compliance with one or
more of the environmental remediation standards established in Chapter 3." Id.
(emphasis added).
165. Id. § 6026.502(a). Section 6026.502(a) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
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One concern raised regarding the liability protection provision
of Act 2 is that it fails to achieve its primary purpose, encouraging
the redevelopment of brownfields. Specifically, critics attack the
fact that the point of compliance is fixed to one point in time and
cannot be changed. 166 Consequently, the burden of any future
remediation at a site again falls on the municipality or a prospective
purchaser, exacerbating the brownfield problem. 167
Furthermore, the liability protection afforded owners under
the site-specific standard is especially troublesome. 168 Critics note
that owners are released from liability for restricted use cleanups
regardless of whether there is an actual proposal to reuse the pro-
spective site for a restricted purpose. 169 The liability protection also
extends beyond brownfields to greenfields. 170 This may result in
producing the reverse effect of what the law intended to accom-
plish, condoning and even encouraging "the permanent conversion
of greenfields into brownfields. 171
Any person included in such an agreement shall not be subject to a citi-
zen suit, other contribution actions brought by responsible persons not
participating in the remediation of the property or other actions brought
by the department with respect to the property except those which may
be necessary to enforce the terms of the agreement.
Id. The cleanup liabilities for persons engaged in the cleanup and reuse of special
industrial properties include the following:
(1) The person shall only be responsible for remediation of any immedi-
ate, direct or imminent threats to public health or the environment, such
as drummed waste, which would prevent the property from being occu-
pied for its intended purpose.
(2) The person shall not be held responsible for the remediation of any
contamination identified in the environmental report, other than the
contamination noted in paragraph (1).
(3) Nothing in this act shall relieve the person from any cleanup liability
for contamination later caused by that person on the property.
Id. § 6026.502(b).





171. ELI Draft Article, supra note 129, at 2. The "owner's choice" scenario
sanctions the abandonment of existing sites by allowing property owners to opt for
the least expensive method of obtaining the liability protection of Chapter 5. Id. at
4. Property owners may simply clean the property to the industrial site standard
which can be achieved or maintained with minimal "institutional controls" such as:
(1) fencing; (2) soil capping; or (3) deed restrictions limiting the future use of the
site. Id. Because many of these brownfields are located in older cities where no
prospects of industrial use exists, these numerous sites could leave municipalities
with a plethora of locked-up and restricted land with "no one around to clean
them up for higher commercial, residential or public use." Id.
19971
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6. Industrial Land Recycling Fund
In order to finance implementation of Acts 2 and 3, the Legis-
lature enacted The Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act
(Act 4).172 Act 4 established the "Industrial Land Recycling
Fund."173 Monies are deposited into the fund in order to provide
financial assistance to innocent parties undertaking voluntary
cleanup at industrial sites.174 The funding is accomplished through
a provision providing financial assistance for the costs of imple-
menting an environmental study and cleanup plan. 75 Under the
provisions of the fund, innocent parties could potentially be reim-
bursed for up to seventy-five percent of the cost of these expendi-
tures. 176 In addition, the Department of Commerce is authorized
to grant low interest loans to eligible parties. 77
172. The Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act §§ 1-5, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996).
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.702 (West Supp. 1996).
174. Id. § 6026.702(b). The purpose of the fund is:
to provide financial assistance to persons who did not cause or contribute
to the contamination on property used for industrial activity on or before
the effective date of this act and who propose to undertake a voluntary
cleanup of the property. The financial assistance shall be in an amount
of up to 75% of the costs incurred for completing an environmental study
and implementing a cleanup plan by an eligible applicant. Financial
assistance may be in the form of grants as provided in this section or low-
interest loans, to be lent at a rate not to exceed 2%.
Id.
In addition to the monies appropriated by the General Assembly, the act au-
thorizes the transfer of fifteen million dollars from the Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Fund. Id. § 6 025. 70 2(g).
175. See id. Under section 6026.702 (c), grants may be made to political subdi-
visions or local economic agencies for the purposes of conducting a cleanup. Id.
§ 6026.702(c).
176. The Liability Issue, supra note 102, at D-22.
177. Seetide 35, § 6026.702(d). Under section 6026.702(e), priority for finan-
cial assistance is available to those applicants satisfying certain statutorily defined
criteria. Id. § 702(e). When determining whether applicants will receive financial
assistance, the DEP will take the following factors into consideration:
(1) The benefit of the remedy to public health, safety and the
environment;
(2) The permanence of the remedy;
(3) The cost effectiveness of the remedy in comparison with other
alternatives;
(4) The financial condition of the applicant;
(5) The financial or economic distress of the area in which the cleanup
is being conducted;
(6) The potential for economic development;
The Department of Commerce shall consult with the department when
determining priorities for funding under this section.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender
Environmental Liability Protection Act
Concurrent with the passage of Act 2, the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture passed the Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and
Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act (Act 3).178 In recog-
nition of certain groups' fears of incurring liability, the act limits
the environmental liability of: (1) economic development agen-
cies;1 79 (2) lenders;180 and (3) fiduciaries.181 Indeed, the stated
178. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental
Liability Protection Act (Act 3) §§ 1-5, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6027.1-.5 (West
Supp. 1996).
179. "Economic Development Agencies" are defined as:
(1) Any redevelopment authority created under the act of May 24, 1945
(PL. 991, No. 385), known as the Urban Redevelopment Law.
(2) Any industrial development agency as that term is defined in the act
of May 17, 1956 (1955 PL. 1609, No. 537), known as the Pennsylvania
Industrial Development Authority Act.
(3) Any industrial and commercial development authority created under
the act of August 23, 1967 (PL. 251, No. 102), known as the Economic
Development Financing Law.
(4) Any area loan organization as that term is defined in the act ofJuly 2,
1984 (PL. 545, No. 109), known as the Capital Loan Fund Act.
(5) Any other Commonwealth or municipal authority which acquires ti-
de or an interest in property.
(6) Municipalities or municipal industrial development or community
development departments organized by ordinance under a home rule
charter which buy and sell land for community development purposes.
(7) Tourist promotion agencies or their local community-based non-
profit sponsor which engage in the acquisition of former industrial sites
as part of an "Industrial Heritage" or similar program.
(8) Conservancies engaged in the renewal or reclamation of an indus-
trial site.
Id. § 6027.3.
180. Act 3 defines "lender" as:
[a]ny person regulated or supervised by any Federal or State regulatory
agency and any of its affiliates or subsidiaries, successors or assigns, in-
cluding its officers, directors, employees, representatives or agents, and
any Federal or State banking or lending agency or its successors, includ-
ing, but not limited to, Resolution Trust Corporation, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Bank, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank, National Credit
Union Administrator Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Office of Thrift Supervision, Farm Credit Administration and Small Busi-
ness Administration or a similarly chartered Federal instrumentality. The
term also includes the initial lender and any subsequent holder of a se-
curity interest or note, guarantor, lease financier or any successor or a
receiver or other person who acts on behalf or for the benefit of a holder
of a security interest. The term includes an economic development
agency.
Id.
181. The act defines "fiduciary" as:
[a] ny person which is considered a fiduciary under section 3(21) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (PL. No. 93-406, 29
1997]
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policy of Act 3 expressly acknowledges economic development
agencies' reluctance to acquire title to, or other interests in,
property.1 82
1. Economic Development Agency Environmental Liability
The first category of parties relieved from liability are "eco-
nomic development agencies." 183 The release from liability applies
where the agency "holds an 'indicia of ownership' 184 in property as
a 'security interest' 185 for the purpose of developing or redevelop-
U.S.C. § 1002(21)) or who acts as trustee, executor, administrator, custo-
dian, guardian of estates, conservator, committee of estates of persons
who are disabled, personal representative, receiver, agent, nominee, reg-
istrar of stocks and bonds, assignee or in any other capacity for the bene-
fit of another person.
Id. § 6027.3.
182. Id. § 6027.2(5).
183. Id. § 6027.4.
184. "Indicia of ownership" is defined as:
[any legal or equitable interest in property acquired directly or
indirectly:
(1) for securing payment of a loan or indebtedness, a right of reimburse-
ment or subrogation under a guaranty or the performance of another
obligation;
(2) evidencing ownership under a lease financing transaction where the
lessor does not initially select or ordinarily control the daily operation or
maintenance of the property; or
(3) in the course of creating, protecting or enforcing a security interest
or right of reimbursement of subrogation under a guaranty.
The term includes evidence of interest in mortgages, deeds of trust, liens,
surety bonds, guaranties, and lease financing transactions where the les-
sor does not initially select nor ordinarily control the daily operation or
maintenance of the property, or other forms of encumbrances against
property recognized under applicable law as vesting the holder of the
security interest with some indicia of title.
Id. § 6027.3.
185. Act 3 defines "security interest" as:
[a]n interest in property created or established for the purpose of secur-
ing a loan, right of reimbursement or subrogation under a guaranty or
other obligation or constituting a lease financing transaction. The term
includes security interests created under 13 Pa.C.S. (relating to commer-
cial code), mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, lease financing transactions in
which the lessor does not initially select or ordinarily control the daily
operation or maintenance of the property, trust receipt transactions and
their equivalents. Security interest may also arise from transactions such
as sales and leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, certain assign-
ments, factoring agreements, accounts receivable, financing arrange-
ments and consignments if the transaction creates or establishes an
interest in property for the purpose of securing a loan, right of reim-
bursement or subrogation under a guaranty or other obligation. The
term also includes a confession ofjudgment or moneyjudgment whereby
a lender commences an execution on such judgments with a writ of exe-
cution and thereby causes property to be levied and attached.
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ing the property or to finance an economic development or rede-
velopment activity . *..."186 The liability release occurs in four
circumstances: (1) the agency must not have directly caused an im-
mediate release or directly exacerbated a release of a contaminated
substance;18 7 (2) an agency forecloses on or assumes possession of a
property; 18 8 (3) an agency conducts a remedial action pursuant to a
written agreement with the DEP;189 or (4) the agency acts in coop-
eration with governmental agencies in performing a remedial ac-
tion.190 Act 3's limitation on liability, similar to Act 2's, does not
include federal entities.191
2. Lender Environmental Liability
The second group of persons relieved from liability are lend-
ers.192 Lenders who engage in activities involved in the "routine
practices of commercial lending"'93 are relieved from liability to
the DEP and any other persons. 194 A lender is not relieved from
liability, however, if the lender: (1) directly caused an immediate
release or directly exacerbated a release of a contaminated sub-
stance; or (2) knowingly and willfully compelled the borrower to
186. Id. § 6027.4.
187. Id. § 6027.4(1).
188. Id. § 6027.4(2).
189. Id. § 6027.4(3).
190. Id. § 6027.4(4). For a liability release to apply in the situation where an
agency has cooperated with a governmental agency in performing a remedial ac-
tion, the following three factors must be met:
(i) An economic development agency and any of its successors and as-
signs may take no action that would disturb or be inconsistent with reme-
dial response that is proposed, approved or implemented by the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency.
(ii) An economic development agency and any of its successors and as-
signs shall permit access to Federal and Commonwealth agencies and
other parties acting under the direction of those agencies to evaluate,
perform or maintain a remedial action.
(iii) An economic development agency or any of its successors and as-
signs shall perform, operate and maintain remedial actions pursuant to
State laws as directed by the department.
Id. § 6027.4(4) (i)-(iii).
191. See The Liability Issue, supra note 102, at F7.
192. For the definition of "lender," see supra note 180.
193. See title 35, § 6027.5(a). Routine practices include, but are not limited
to: (1) the providing of financial services; (2) holding of security interests; (3)
workout practices; (4) foreclosure; or (5) the recovery of funds from the sale of
property. See id.
194. If the lender is involved in the "routine practices of commercial lend-
ing," the lender "shall not be liable under the environmental acts or common law
equivalents to the Department of Environmental Resources or to any other person
by virtue of the fact that the lender engages in such commercial lending practice
.. .. Id.
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cause the release of a regulated substance or to violate an environ-
mental act.195 It is also important to note that a lender's liability is
limited to the cost of any response actions resulting from the
lender's activities. 196 Nevertheless, a lender may still be liable as an
owner or operator under federal statutes.197
3. Fiduciary Environmental Liability
The third and final group of persons granted liability protec-
tion under Act 3 are "fiduciaries."1 98 Any person acting as a fiduci-
ary is not liable either in their personal or individual capacity
merely by virtue of providing such services.' 99 Liability may be im-
posed, however, under the following circumstances: (1) a release
occurred during the time the fiduciaries services were actively pro-
vided; (2) the fiduciary has the "express power" and "authority" to
control the property where the release occurred; or (3) the release
occurred as a result of the gross negligence or willful misconduct of
the fiduciary.200 Similar to lender liability, a fiduciary's liability is
limited to the cost of a response action directly attributable to the
fiduciary's activities. 201
195. Id.
196. Id. § 6027.5(b). Act 3 provides that:
[l]iability shall arise only if the lender's actions were the proximate and
efficient cause of the release or violation. Ownership or control of the
property after foreclosure shall not by itself trigger liability. No lender
shall be liable for any response action if such response action arises solely
from a release of regulated substances which occurred prior to or com-
mences before and continues after foreclosure, provided, however, that
the lender shall be responsible for that portion of the response action
which is directly attributed to the lender's exacerbation of a release.
Id.
197. The Liability Issue, supra note 102, at F10.
198. See supra note 181 for definition of "fiduciary."
199. See title 35, § 6027.6(a).
200. Id.
201. Id. § 6027.6(b). Section 6027.6(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
No fiduciary shall be liable for any response action if such response ac-
tion arises from a release of regulated substances which occurred prior to
or commences before and continues after the fiduciary takes action as
specified in subsection (a). Notwithstanding the foregoing, a fiduciary
shall be responsible for that portion of a response action which is directly
attributable to exacerbating a release. A release of regulated substances
discovered in the course of conducting an environmental due diligence
shall be presumed to be a prior and continuing release on the property.
42
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss1/4
BROWNFIELDS LEGISLATION
C. Relationship of Pennsylvania Legislation to Federal
Superfund Law
When analyzing the liability protection provision of Act 2, it is
important to remember its relationship to federal Superfund law. 202
Even after the passage of Act 2, developers and investors still have
concerns about reusing abandoned industrial sites, fearing they
may be liable for cleanup costs under federal environmental stan-
dards. 20 3 They are concerned EPA does not possess "the authority
or flexibility to offer liability releases that will provide real and ef-
fective incentives to join [state] programs .. "204 Without this au-
thority, critics fear that the effectiveness of any state brownfields
program is severely limited.205
While CERCLA's liability provisions preempt any conflicting
state brownfields initiatives (where they conflict), room exists to ac-
commodate these initiatives. The majority of sites in the country
are not listed on Superfund's National Priorities List (NPL);206
therefore, state law is equally as important as federal law in address-
ing the cleanup of industrial sites.20 7
202. As section 904(a) of Act 2 states: "The provisions of this act shall not
prevent the Commonwealth from enforcing specific numerical cleanup standards,
monitoring or compliance requirements specifically required to be enforced by
the Federal Government as a condition to receive program authorization, delega-
tion, primacy or Federal funds." Id. § 6026.904(a).
203. Bill Removes Brownfields' Final Hurdles, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Febru-
ary 9, 1996, at A12.
204. Stephen C. Jones, Unless Congress Authorizes the EPA to Grant Developers Re-
leases From Liability, New Inner-City Cleanup Programs May Be of Limited Value, NAT'L
L.J., May 15, 1995, at B6. "The primary problem facing state brownfields programs
is that they cannot protect redevelopers from federal liability under CERCLA or
other federal laws." Id. Carol Browner, EPA Administrator, notes that EPA is lim-
ited in its ability to make reforms under CERCLA without the passage of a new law.
News Conference with Carol Browner, EPA Administrator, (Oct. 2, 1995).
Browner notes that the administrative changes EPA makes are more effectively
achieved by changing the law. Id. "[OQuite frankly, it is time for Congress to
change the law." Id.
205. Jones, supra note 204, at B6.
206. See Waste and Hazardous Substances Brownfields: EPA Funds More Pilots, De-
lists Superfund Sites, American Political Network Greenwire, Jan. 26, 1996. Last year
alone EPA removed 24,000 sites from the Superfund List to enhance their chances
for redevelopment. Id.
207. ELI Draft Article, supra note 129, at 8. Even under federal law, the appli-
cable, relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARS) look to state law for
cleanup standards other than maximum contamination levels. Id. The cleanup
standards under Act 2 are specifically identified as applicable, relevant and appro-
priate under state law for purposes of Superfund. Land Recycling Act Seminar,
supra note 104, at 4. It is important to note, however, that these standards do not
preempt the more stringent federal cleanup standards required to be imposed
under Superfund or the national contingency plan. Id.
1997] 203
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V. CONCLUSION
While the threat of liability under Superfund constantly lurks
behind every state brownfields initiative,208 a viable solution to the
brownfields problem plaguing the states remains.20 9 Until Con-
gress enacts new legislation to address CERCLA's unrealistic and
archaic liability structure, states must attack the problem on their
own.210 The basic concept of Pennsylvania's brownfields program
is sensible: expedite the cleanup of contaminated sites while simul-
taneously slowing the loss of open lands by "encouraging cleanup
and reuse of old sites" through the limiting of liability of brownfield
owners and developers.2 11 Abatement of the proliferation of
brownfields is possible only through the establishment of realistic
cleanup standards based upon the actual risk to health and the en-
vironment posed by these contaminated properties.2 1 2 By passing
brownfield legislation, Pennsylvania has come a long way in ad-
dressing the problems plaguing current Superfund laws.2 1 3 One
only hopes Congress will take the lead from Pennsylvania and at-
tack the problem at the federal level, thus finally removing barriers
to economic development at the state level and restoring a proper
federal-state balance.
Thomas G. Kessler
208. For a discussion of the relationship of federal Superfund laws to state
laws, see supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the beneficial effects of Pennsylvania's brownfields
program, see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of CERCLA's harsh liability scheme, see supra notes 45-
59 and accompanying text.
211. ELI Draft Article, supra note 129, at 2.
212. Id.
213. For a discussion of what changes need to be made to the current
Superfund law, see supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
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